Russia, Turkey and the Frontiers of Europe

According to the EU treaty, any European state that respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union. That is clearly not the case with present-day Russia and Turkey. While the former has never considered membership, the latter had applied to join.in 1987.  For various reasons, both nations have moved away from the values mentioned in Article 2, namely: "respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities." 

There are also countries that respect these values but are geographically outside Europe. These include Canada, Mexico, New Zealand, Brazil and South Africa.  I highlight this point because I often question whether Europe, as an idea based on values, should be limited by geographical frontiers. In this sense, commitment to democratic norms is the most defining aspect in a world of creeping authoritarianism where the USA is fast devolving in to a threat.  In fact keeping appearances has become one of the most pathetic aspects of EU and UK foreign policy.

But what if Russia and Turkey one day embrace the values enshrined in Article 2? Then there should be no reason why they could not join if they aspired to.  Of course, this exercise veers into useless speculation, although a post-Erdogan Turkey may be a less distant prospect than a "de-Putinised" Russia. And hopefully the European Union will not turn its back on the protest movement against Erdogan's attempt to criminalise the democratic and secular opposition.  But the EU is also partly to blame for Turkey's descent in to autocracy.  Instead of pressing for democratic reforms in return for membership, EU leaders like Sarkozy had excluded Turkey on cultural and ethnic grounds.  

But there can be no doubt that Russia and Turkey are an integral part of European history and culture, just as the UK, which decided to leave, remains so. Russia has not only been a part of Europe but has shaped its intellectual, political, and cultural fabric. Can one imagine Europe without Dostoyevsky, Bulgakov, Gogol, Herzen, Tolstoy, Bakunin, Lenin, Trotsky, and Pasternak? Moreover, an intellectual undercurrent throughout Russian history has looked towards revolutionary France for inspiration, to the extent that the band welcoming Lenin back to Russia from exile played La Marseillaise. Neither can one ignore the great contribution of the cosmopolitan Jewish diaspora: Rosa Luxemburg as born in Russian occupied Poland and moved to Germany to become one of the most prominent socialist leaders. The divide between east and west in eurpope is neither ethnic nor geographical. It is a product of history and political economy: mainly because serdom and fuedalism were abolished at an earlier stage in western europe. Even Gorbachev, the last President of the Soviet Union, constantly referred to the "common European home" in his book Perestroika.  And while there is currently a stronger pull towards authoritarianism and empire, partly as a reflection of the concentration of wealth in the hands of an oligarchy, I would not be surprised if the regime were to collapse like a deck of cards in the foreseeable future. My hunch is that it will happen like a bolt from the blue.  What is sure is that what  triggered the Russian invasion of Ukraine was the Euromaidan revolution which repositioned this country in the European community of democracies.

But even if Russia embarks on another path, would it be too big for Europe? And would this not make a political union untenable? Still excluding them on geographical or cultural grounds would amount to a blatant act of racism.  Still neither can we assume that a democratic Russia or Turkey would automatically want to join the EU even if I strongly believe that the strength of the European imaginary lies in its seductive appeal. The moment Europe loses its appeal, it will wither away and die. That is why an essential part of the European project should be the creation of a wider community of democracies—one that shares many characteristics with the European Union but offers greater flexibility to countries that, for now, may be too large to fit within the more restricted and necessarily more united EU. It is also vital that this parallel project includes democracies in the global south. For one of Europe's greatest failures, partly as a result of colonial legacy, was to reach out to countries like Brazil and South Africa. This is why Europe's weak response to war crimes, displacement and what increasingly looks as ethnic cleansing in Gaza was so disappointing. Sure I am the first to recognise that jewsishness is a central characteristic which defines European identity, but that should be even more reason to say 'Never again' irrespective of whether the crimes are committed by Hamas or Netanyahu's far right government. 

 The irony, however, is that while I muse about Europe, the risk is that the dream will be extinguished or turned into a nightmare. Just as Meloni and Abela are toying with changes to the European Convention on Human Rights, some may even be tempted to amend the treaties to accommodate far-right governments. Given the circumstances, it is increasingly becoming a choice between more Europe or no Europe at all.

Benigni’s European Imaginary and Its Contested Legacy

A few days ago, during a peak-time show on Rai, Italian actor/screenwriter Roberto Benigni hailed the "European dream" conjured by the "heroes of Ventotene"—Altiero Spinelli, Ernesto Rossi, and Eugenio Colorni—who drafted the 1941 Manifesto calling for a federal European Union based on democratic socialist, liberal, and republican values.

In these dark times, Benigni went on to exhort us to be proud to be European: "Europe is the smallest continent in the world that lit the fuse of all revolutions; it transformed the planet, it forged the greatest thoughts of humanity, inventing logic, reason, doubt," as well as "freedom, democracy, theatre, sport, modern chemistry, social conscience," among others, creating a "common heritage, an immense treasure in all fields."

Not surprisingly, Benigni’s call resonated with the liberal left but irked the post-fascist Giorgia Meloni, who retorted in parliament: "I don't know if this is your Europe, but it's certainly not mine."

This is a reminder that 'Europe' itself is an imaginary construct rooted in ideology and history. Of course, Benigni referred to the best of European traditions—harking back to Machiavelli and Spinoza, the idea of progress and justice unleashed by the 1789 and 1848 revolutions, and the heroic anti-fascist struggles, both during the war and in the upheavals of 1968. However, his eulogy overlooks the dark side of European history: feudalism, the Crusades, colonialism, anti-Semitism, and fascism—traditions that were never extinguished and are alive and kicking in the far right. In a way, he was offering comfort food for the disoriented—a celebration of what distinguishes us from the vulgarity and rudeness of Trump's America. But on another level, Benigni's exhortation is an invitation to reclaim that Europe of immense possibilities. This may well translate into a civic patriotism that offers hope in a time of despair.  

But like any ideology, the European 'imaginary' is rooted in a historical context. The European social model itself is a fragile historical incident, based on the realisation by elites on both sides of the Atlantic that the only way to prevent communist revolution in this patch of earth was through social democracy, with security needs outsourced to the USA. Of course, this was no clear-cut process, and there were instances—similar to what happened on a much larger scale in Latin America—where the US relied on reactionaries and even fascists to prevent communists from winning power through elections in countries like Italy. Still, by the end of the 20th century, Europe had become a beacon of rights and social liberalism, which explains its appeal to young and educated people in Eastern Europe. In fact, the Russian invasion of  Ukraine can by partly explained by Putin's Russia's fear of the European imaginary—a fear triggered by the Euromaidan uprising—that it could represent a different future not only for the former subjects of the Czarist and Stalinist empires but also for Russia itself.  In fact, Putin represents the rejection of a long-standing European Russian tradition shaped by advanced liberal and socialist ideas which emerged in the continent particularly in communities of exiled revolutionaries whose commitment transcended borders.

Yet this imaginary remains contested, as it risks being deformed and reshaped by an aggressive right wing  that may use this difficult historical moment to push forward a militaristic agenda, potentially making the continent even more dependent on the US. The right is already winning many cultural battles, including on migration, where Malta’s Labour PM is doing Meloni’s bidding in an attempt to reword the European Convention on Human Rights. Moreover, incrementalists like Meloni  may be even more dangerous—diluting European values from within instead of openly rejecting the EU project.  That is why the left should engage with the emerging civic movement for European unity rather than retreat into a 'holier-than-thou' puritanism and equidistance, which in the current circumstances borders on the myopic and the moronic.  But the left can save such a movement from its own pitfalls; by stressing the importance of social and economic reforms aimed at restoring a social model, eroded by two decades of austerity which left the continent vulnerable to the onslaught of the far right.

Neutral from the European Union?

Malta's active neutrality was conceived during the Cold War when Malta identified with the Non-Aligned Movement, an attempt by former colonies to affirm their independence from the two superpowers of the time: the United States and its allies, and the Soviet bloc. As conceived at the time, the constitutional clause precludes the use of Malta as a military base but does not preclude security guarantees. To this extent, in 1976, the Labour Party's electoral manifesto proposed that Malta enter into a four-nation guarantee for its security with Italy, France, Libya, and Algeria.

In 2004, Malta joined the European Union with two provisos: a protocol affirming that abortion remains a national prerogative and a declaration affirming Malta's constitutional neutrality. Over the next two decades, Maltese foreign policy was broadly aligned with that of the European Union, and like all member states, Malta is a signatory to the mutual defence clause in the Treaty of Lisbon, which states that "if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter." However, this is qualified by the proviso that it should "not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States." It remains unclear how this clause can be effectively enforced without NATO involvement. Malta remains one of three neutral countries in the European Union, alongside Austria and Ireland.

History did not stop in 2004. In fact, even then, history was unfolding when the US, with the support of the UK (then an EU member), invaded Iraq, splitting the EU into two camps: Italy, Spain, and Poland participated in the invasion, while France and Germany opposed it. While the former affirmed Atlanticist ties, the latter began asserting European autonomy. However, US defence commitments to its Western European allies were never questioned, especially following the election of Barack Obama to the White House. The first doubts began emerging during the Trump presidency, which raised questions about whether Europeans and Americans still shared a common set of values. But the election of Joe Biden and the Russian invasion of Ukraine reaffirmed the alliance. Finland and Sweden—two neutral social democracies—also opted to join NATO in response to this very real threat, a move endorsed by a wide spectrum of society in both countries.

What finally rocked the boat was the re-election of Donald Trump, JD Vance's ideological assault in a speech in Munich, and the humiliation of Zelensky in a meeting with Trump in the Oval Office. This triggered a contradictory response: on one hand, EU leaders speak of strategic autonomy, while on the other, they remain responsive to Trump's calls for EU member states to pay their NATO dues. Moreover there a also a risk that  increased military spending ends up increasing the EU's dependence on US arms exports at least in the short term.  This raises the question: Will increased military spending strengthen or weaken Europe's political autonomy? And how advisable is it to enhance military cooperation and spending in the absence of a federal structure of government that can subject defence structures to democratic scrutiny?  In short, can there be a defence union without a political union? Can one put the cart before the horse?

That said, with Russia and the USA actively seeking to weaken the EU, the writing is on the wall: Europe can only survive as an autonomous bloc if it affirms its political unity. And any political unity must be based on a common set of democratic values—values that are actively being challenged from within. This challenge raises the most pertinent question about the desirability of militarisation: what happens if this power falls into the hands of a victorious internal enemy? It is also worth noting that to defeat this internal enemy, the EU must boost its social and infrastructural spending. While Europe needs to defend itself from an aggressive neighbour, all will be in vain if Europe falls into the hands of authoritarians, some of whom are already dictating the tune of EU policy.  The risk is that this militaristic drift will end up undermining the very values we are supposed to be defending.  So while I welcome any relaxation of deficit rules,  a balancing act is needed between military and social needs.  Any debt break needs to include provisions for increased spending on climate change, infrastructure and social welfare.  For to win the ideological war democrats must have the tools to invest in welfare, health, education and general well being.   

And where does Malta fit into all this? Let's face it: Malta is no military power and is under no significant pressure to contribute to the EU's military needs. What I find troubling is the affirmation of our neutrality as a way of asserting independence not from NATO, the USA, or Russia, but from the EU itself, of which we are a member. Moreover, history will not wait for us. Europe faces a choice between democratic federalism and a relapse into aggressive nation-states, torn apart by external powers. What concerns me is not our military neutrality but the discourse in which it is sometimes framed—for example, the Prime Minister's failure to express solidarity with Ukraine following the humiliation of its leader in the Oval Office. In the end, we can remain militarily neutral, but we must also be clear about where we stand in the divide between autocracies and democracies. Yes, we should also call out the gross hypocrisy on Gaza, but the most effective way to do so is by joining other EU member states that have given full recognition to the state of Palestine.   In this sense we should be active participants in the conservation not just as a nation but also as EU citizens.  For ultimately the future of the EU depends on the emergence of a new polity of citizens whose concerns are not limited to the narrow interests of the individual nation states.  

Reflections in Unprecedented Times: From COVID to Trump

Five years after the pandemic, during which I revived this on-and-off personal blog, I intend to reinvent it as a space for analysis and reflections on global issues. Why? Mostly in the hope that, through reflection, I can resolve my own contradictions and conflicts. Also, to be read by people who, like me, are struggling to understand. My hope is that this will contribute to a wider discussion and debate, particularly among those on the left of the political spectrum.

I will offer no certainties. Moreover, I will challenge other people’s (and my own) certainties and fetishes. But I am also averse to dispassionate or neutral analysis. I will often try to detach myself to see things from different perspectives, but my optics are shaped by my history. Moreover, I believe in a free and equal society, and I consider fascism in its various forms an existential threat, as are climate change and the carving up of the world into spheres of influence or plunder.

This blog is, of course, triggered by the chaos unleashed by Trump’s election, which has cast a dark shadow not just on the USA—where democratic liberties, including the right to protest, are under threat—but also on the rest of the world, particularly Europe, Ukraine, and Palestine.

There are surely parallels between what happened five years ago and what is happening now. Both events were triggered by unprecedented developments that took time to fathom and that altered our actions and daily lives. Obviously, I am not a neutral observer—I come with baggage: that of a radical democrat and a European and global citizen. So, although I am Maltese and understand the reality I live in, I also view the world from an internationalist angle. And while I do not value European lives more than others, I gravitate toward an idea of ‘Europe’—an imagined community defined by a commitment to democratic values, albeit one to which I am both attached and critical. The best representation of this imagined community is the Manifesto di Ventotene, written during the Second World War by Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi. There is, however, a growing gap between the imagined community and the real one. Yet necessity can be the mother of invention, and a phoenix may well rise from the ashes and hubris of these times.

I am also generally averse to militarism and war-mongering. But I come from a political culture that reveres the World War II partisans who stood boldly and said: No Pasarán. To be in a position to do this, one must have the ability to hit back and march forward. My reflections will be full of doubts and uncertainties, along with the realization that any solution is temporary and imperfect. Even more so, they will begin with the recognition that all global state actors are flawed and potential villains. There are no knights in shining armour—only actors shaped by electorates in an age of misinformation produced on an industrial scale. They reflect the conflicting pressures of dominant elites, but also the influence of civil society and democratic struggles. While many imperfections can be tolerated in different circumstances, there are existential threats and viruses against which we need antibodies. This is a small contribution to collective sanity; which is the greatest antibody against the internal and external threats which are consuming us. 

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