The return of the Zombies (they never actually left)

Italian Prime Minister Meloni told Trump that her goal is "to make the West great again", criticising "woke ideology" and championing the "war against illegal migration". This, apparently, was music to the ears of the US authoritarian strongman, who clearly shares the same values.

But what exactly does the term West mean? Interestingly, the term is defined here in two binary polarities: against the enemy within (woke ideology), and the external enemy—the immigrants from the Global South. In this sense, their ideological project is to restore the West to its "true" self: colonial, racist, and aggressive. It is the West cleansed of all the social progress achieved through protest and struggle since the end of the Second World War, including the revolutions of 1968.

Let’s not forget that the US, throughout history, has had no qualms about co-opting the far right to combat communism. This happened with murderous, large-scale intensity in Latin America. But it also happened in Italy, where secret services aligned with the US promoted the strategy of tension, aimed at provoking a right-wing coup to prevent the entry of the PCI into government. This included the planting of bombs in train stations by neo-fascists.

I’m not sure how far the transactional and insular Donald Trump is invested in this project—but some of his allies definitely are. More traditional Republicans, like Marco Rubio, also seem more comfortable operating in a Cold War dynamic.

Moreover, geopolitical and historical realities militate against an alliance of autocrats. Russia simply cannot appear to submit to US orders. In the coming days, it may be tempted to snatch a favourable deal, but this may be outweighed by other geopolitical considerations, including rivalry in the Arctic and the Middle East.

What Trump has managed to do is scare Europeans into investing more in their NATO commitments, without taking any concrete steps towards European unity. All this while reducing Ukraine to a colonial fiefdom, bound by a neo-colonial 'minerals' deal that looks more like protection money paid to a gangster. I do not blame Zelenskyy for accepting the deal while facing daily and brutal bombardments. But in the long term, this deal is bound to be fodder for Russia’s ability to destabilise Ukraine—simply because it strengthens the narrative that pro-Western politicians like Zelenskyy have sold their country to spite Russia. This is not like joining the EU or even NATO, as it does not come with security guarantees or democratic safeguards. It is just what the Italian mafia calls pizzo.

Of course, there is only one alternative to this: a United States of Europe founded on the values of the post-war struggles for democracy, social justice, and personal autonomy and freedom. A Europe that engages with the Global South, challenges the appeal of autocracy, and builds trust by finally taking a stance against the genocide in Gaza. Sure, this may look delusional and against the direction in which the wind is blowing. For let’s face it: electoral majorities are swinging in the opposite direction. This is also having a chilling effect on the institutions, the courts, and even the media. We are living in reactionary times. But let’s not forget—it looked that way in the 1920s and 1930s. It also looked that way in the 1820s and the 1870s. We are about to enter a long, dark winter—but one which will trigger resistance, and hopefully, another 1848.

To Rearm or Not to Rearm

I believe in European integration. I also understand the need for collective security and defence. I support arming Ukraine in its war against Russia.

But that does not mean I am enthusiastic about increased military spending—especially if it is done to salvage the broken relationship with Trump’s US.

Why should we align our defences with what is effectively a far-right regime, incompatible with so-called European values and openly speaking of annexing Greenland?

The only justification for increased spending would be to break away from the US—not to become further entangled in NATO.
Even in this regard, the priority should be rationalising and pooling resources to ensure that the EU is capable of enforcing its mutual defence clause and to continue supporting Ukraine.

Moreover, we cannot afford to divert funds from social and environmental priorities to fund rearmament.
This will only make Europe more vulnerable—to both external and internal enemies, and to existential threats like climate change.

In this sense, a rearmament agenda that diverts money from social spending and the well-being of citizens would be the final nail in the coffin for the European project we need now more than ever.
People will protest in the streets if further austerity is imposed to finance rearmament.

We should resist the false choice between a militarised continent bound together by hysteria, and a motley crew of weak nation-states increasingly vulnerable to internal and external threats.

Moreover, we need to ask: which values shape our Europe?
How can we say “never again” while condoning and abetting genocide in Palestine?
We also owe it to Jewish communities, whose identity should not be defined by the actions of the Israeli far right.

The greatest tragedy of our times is that Europe is shifting to the right at the very moment when necessity demands a greater unity of purpose.

Of course, we cannot be naïve. Putin poses a serious threat that should be constantly assessed—but not overplayed. 
This is not a time for hysteria, but for a balanced and effective approach.
Eliminating private profits in the defence sector through nationalisation could also help reduce costs.

In a time of monsters, the last thing we need are European leaders posing as warmongers.
There is something comical, clownish and unrealistic when EU officials project themselves as military hawks.
European power, by its nature, is a soft, transformative and insidious power—based on seductive appeal.
That is the power that threatens Putin: the possibility of a future in which Russia itself can be part of our community of values.

What we need are principled European leaders—those who set a vision, who stand up for values, and who invest in our collective well-being.  
That includes keeping us safe from external threats, but let’s not forget the many insecurities people face in daily life.

There is too much at stake.  The cost of failure has never been so high.  

Back to the Corn Laws: Trump’s Tariff Delusions and Class War

Apart from the optics of a US President presiding over a shit show in the Rose Garden—using auto workers as props and holding up a board based on a lie that conflates tariffs with trade deficits (including those of penguin-inhabited islands)—there was another disturbing aspect to Trump’s speech.

In addition to distorting American history by presenting the age of tariffs (and murderous robber barons) as a golden era, Trump hinted that ‘income tax’—a fiscal instrument designed to redistribute wealth—was somehow linked to the reduction of tariffs.

“In 1913, for reasons unknown to mankind, they established the income tax so that citizens, rather than foreign countries, would start paying the money necessary to run our government,” Trump said.

The suggestion was that reintroducing tariffs could pave the way for income tax cuts, which by their very nature would favour the wealthiest Americans. In this way, tariffs that impoverish the poor—both in the US where consumers will take the brunt and in poor countries crippled by the tariffs—would end up funding tax breaks for the rich. It’s like turning back the clock to pre-Corn Law repeal Britain in the 19th century, when tariffs protected the landed gentry while workers paid more for their daily bread. 

Of course, such an outrageous suggestion isn’t based on solid economic reasoning. For tariffs to achieve their stated purpose, they should not be revenue-generating tools. Their goal is to reduce imports in order to prop up domestic industries and safeguard jobs—even if it's hard to see how this works in a world where supply chains are so deeply interconnected. Tariffs may still serve a purpose in developing economies where the state actively drives industrialisation. But that is not the case in the US, where the state is being systematically dismantled.

Trump, however, is a demagogue who lives in a universe of his own truth. So it's no surprise that he defies economic logic, framing his policies as a populist insurrection against shadowy global forces.  This is like Liz Truss harakiri budget multiplied by a hundred.

Some might ask: isn’t what Trump is doing a sign of the end of the neoliberal order, long dominated by the dogmas of unshackled markets? The problem is that instead of advancing toward a new form of international trade governance grounded in social and environmental regulation including labour protections, we are regressing into the age of  hubris—where the poor (both in the US because of inflation and even in the poorest countries crippled by these tariffs)  end up paying more to bankroll the ideological fantasies of Trump and company.  The risk is that by defying economic rationality Trump may well end having no other option but to embark on on pillage and plunder to finance his delusions.   Trade wars may well just be the prelude for conquest.

Gaza: War Crimes, Complicity, and Paralysis

The bodies of 15 Palestinian paramedics and rescue workers, killed by Israeli forces and buried in a mass grave nine days ago in Gaza, were found with their hands or legs tied and gunshot wounds to the head and chest, according to eyewitnesses. The United Nations has called for an investigation into a crime reminiscent of past pogroms, war crimes, and genocides. Yet, there has been little indignation—not just in the United States, which shares direct responsibility after consenting to Netanyahu’s decision to resume the war, but also in Europe. The most shocking reality is that the war in Gaza has become business as usual. There is no discussion of sanctioning Israel, despite mounting evidence of war crimes, including domicide, forced displacement, and the use of starvation as a weapon.

Nothing can justify this level of complicity with Israeli war crimes. This is not a matter of proportionality. What we are witnessing is a far-right regime using Hamas’ war crime as a pretext for the elimination of an entire community—one that was already being oppressed long before October 7, 2023. EU leaders fail to call a spade a spade when they describe Israel’s response as merely disproportionate.  Because genocidal intent can never be seen as being proportional to anything else.  It is a crime.

However, it would be a disservice to the Palestinian cause not to acknowledge the other elephant in the room: the absence of a national leadership capable of standing up to Israel while negotiating on behalf of the Palestinian people. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has been entirely absent, unwilling to stand up for his people. Meanwhile, Hamas’ cult of death and martyrdom does a disservice to their cause. Last week’s protests in Gaza against both Israel and Hamas were significant—not just in their scale, but in the reactions (and silence) they provoked.

“We demonstrated today to declare that we do not want to die. Eventually, it is Israel that attacks and bombs, but Hamas also bears direct responsibility, as do all who define themselves as Arab and Palestinian leaders,” one protester said. Tragically, one of the protest leaders was reportedly kidnapped and murdered.

That said, the paralysis of Palestinian politics is the result of Israel’s long-standing ‘divide and rule’ strategy, including its covert co-option of Hamas to weaken Fatah and its left-wing partners. Meanwhile, militant secular Palestinian leaders like Marwan Barghouti—who could take the liberation struggle to the next stage—languish in Israeli prisons. The stark reality is that Israel prefers fighting a band of criminal fanatics, whose actions serve as a pretext for its aggression, rather than confronting a rational and determined Palestinian leadership—one that is willing to take up arms against oppression but does so judiciously, with the welfare of the population in mind.  

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Russia, Turkey and the Frontiers of Europe

According to the EU treaty, any European state that respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union. That is clearly not the case with present-day Russia and Turkey. While the former has never considered membership, the latter had applied to join.in 1987.  For various reasons, both nations have moved away from the values mentioned in Article 2, namely: "respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities." 

There are also countries that respect these values but are geographically outside Europe. These include Canada, Mexico, New Zealand, Brazil and South Africa.  I highlight this point because I often question whether Europe, as an idea based on values, should be limited by geographical frontiers. In this sense, commitment to democratic norms is the most defining aspect in a world of creeping authoritarianism where the USA is fast devolving in to a threat.  In fact keeping appearances has become one of the most pathetic aspects of EU and UK foreign policy.

But what if Russia and Turkey one day embrace the values enshrined in Article 2? Then there should be no reason why they could not join if they aspired to.  Of course, this exercise veers into useless speculation, although a post-Erdogan Turkey may be a less distant prospect than a "de-Putinised" Russia. And hopefully the European Union will not turn its back on the protest movement against Erdogan's attempt to criminalise the democratic and secular opposition.  But the EU is also partly to blame for Turkey's descent in to autocracy.  Instead of pressing for democratic reforms in return for membership, EU leaders like Sarkozy had excluded Turkey on cultural and ethnic grounds.  

But there can be no doubt that Russia and Turkey are an integral part of European history and culture, just as the UK, which decided to leave, remains so. Russia has not only been a part of Europe but has shaped its intellectual, political, and cultural fabric. Can one imagine Europe without Dostoyevsky, Bulgakov, Gogol, Herzen, Tolstoy, Bakunin, Lenin, Trotsky, and Pasternak? Moreover, an intellectual undercurrent throughout Russian history has looked towards revolutionary France for inspiration, to the extent that the band welcoming Lenin back to Russia from exile played La Marseillaise. Neither can one ignore the great contribution of the cosmopolitan Jewish diaspora: Rosa Luxemburg as born in Russian occupied Poland and moved to Germany to become one of the most prominent socialist leaders. The divide between east and west in eurpope is neither ethnic nor geographical. It is a product of history and political economy: mainly because serdom and fuedalism were abolished at an earlier stage in western europe. Even Gorbachev, the last President of the Soviet Union, constantly referred to the "common European home" in his book Perestroika.  And while there is currently a stronger pull towards authoritarianism and empire, partly as a reflection of the concentration of wealth in the hands of an oligarchy, I would not be surprised if the regime were to collapse like a deck of cards in the foreseeable future. My hunch is that it will happen like a bolt from the blue.  What is sure is that what  triggered the Russian invasion of Ukraine was the Euromaidan revolution which repositioned this country in the European community of democracies.

But even if Russia embarks on another path, would it be too big for Europe? And would this not make a political union untenable? Still excluding them on geographical or cultural grounds would amount to a blatant act of racism.  Still neither can we assume that a democratic Russia or Turkey would automatically want to join the EU even if I strongly believe that the strength of the European imaginary lies in its seductive appeal. The moment Europe loses its appeal, it will wither away and die. That is why an essential part of the European project should be the creation of a wider community of democracies—one that shares many characteristics with the European Union but offers greater flexibility to countries that, for now, may be too large to fit within the more restricted and necessarily more united EU. It is also vital that this parallel project includes democracies in the global south. For one of Europe's greatest failures, partly as a result of colonial legacy, was to reach out to countries like Brazil and South Africa. This is why Europe's weak response to war crimes, displacement and what increasingly looks as ethnic cleansing in Gaza was so disappointing. Sure I am the first to recognise that jewsishness is a central characteristic which defines European identity, but that should be even more reason to say 'Never again' irrespective of whether the crimes are committed by Hamas or Netanyahu's far right government. 

 The irony, however, is that while I muse about Europe, the risk is that the dream will be extinguished or turned into a nightmare. Just as Meloni and Abela are toying with changes to the European Convention on Human Rights, some may even be tempted to amend the treaties to accommodate far-right governments. Given the circumstances, it is increasingly becoming a choice between more Europe or no Europe at all.

Benigni’s European Imaginary and Its Contested Legacy

A few days ago, during a peak-time show on Rai, Italian actor/screenwriter Roberto Benigni hailed the "European dream" conjured by the "heroes of Ventotene"—Altiero Spinelli, Ernesto Rossi, and Eugenio Colorni—who drafted the 1941 Manifesto calling for a federal European Union based on democratic socialist, liberal, and republican values.

In these dark times, Benigni went on to exhort us to be proud to be European: "Europe is the smallest continent in the world that lit the fuse of all revolutions; it transformed the planet, it forged the greatest thoughts of humanity, inventing logic, reason, doubt," as well as "freedom, democracy, theatre, sport, modern chemistry, social conscience," among others, creating a "common heritage, an immense treasure in all fields."

Not surprisingly, Benigni’s call resonated with the liberal left but irked the post-fascist Giorgia Meloni, who retorted in parliament: "I don't know if this is your Europe, but it's certainly not mine."

This is a reminder that 'Europe' itself is an imaginary construct rooted in ideology and history. Of course, Benigni referred to the best of European traditions—harking back to Machiavelli and Spinoza, the idea of progress and justice unleashed by the 1789 and 1848 revolutions, and the heroic anti-fascist struggles, both during the war and in the upheavals of 1968. However, his eulogy overlooks the dark side of European history: feudalism, the Crusades, colonialism, anti-Semitism, and fascism—traditions that were never extinguished and are alive and kicking in the far right. In a way, he was offering comfort food for the disoriented—a celebration of what distinguishes us from the vulgarity and rudeness of Trump's America. But on another level, Benigni's exhortation is an invitation to reclaim that Europe of immense possibilities. This may well translate into a civic patriotism that offers hope in a time of despair.  

But like any ideology, the European 'imaginary' is rooted in a historical context. The European social model itself is a fragile historical incident, based on the realisation by elites on both sides of the Atlantic that the only way to prevent communist revolution in this patch of earth was through social democracy, with security needs outsourced to the USA. Of course, this was no clear-cut process, and there were instances—similar to what happened on a much larger scale in Latin America—where the US relied on reactionaries and even fascists to prevent communists from winning power through elections in countries like Italy. Still, by the end of the 20th century, Europe had become a beacon of rights and social liberalism, which explains its appeal to young and educated people in Eastern Europe. In fact, the Russian invasion of  Ukraine can by partly explained by Putin's Russia's fear of the European imaginary—a fear triggered by the Euromaidan uprising—that it could represent a different future not only for the former subjects of the Czarist and Stalinist empires but also for Russia itself.  In fact, Putin represents the rejection of a long-standing European Russian tradition shaped by advanced liberal and socialist ideas which emerged in the continent particularly in communities of exiled revolutionaries whose commitment transcended borders.

Yet this imaginary remains contested, as it risks being deformed and reshaped by an aggressive right wing  that may use this difficult historical moment to push forward a militaristic agenda, potentially making the continent even more dependent on the US. The right is already winning many cultural battles, including on migration, where Malta’s Labour PM is doing Meloni’s bidding in an attempt to reword the European Convention on Human Rights. Moreover, incrementalists like Meloni  may be even more dangerous—diluting European values from within instead of openly rejecting the EU project.  That is why the left should engage with the emerging civic movement for European unity rather than retreat into a 'holier-than-thou' puritanism and equidistance, which in the current circumstances borders on the myopic and the moronic.  But the left can save such a movement from its own pitfalls; by stressing the importance of social and economic reforms aimed at restoring a social model, eroded by two decades of austerity which left the continent vulnerable to the onslaught of the far right.

Neutral from the European Union?

Malta's active neutrality was conceived during the Cold War when Malta identified with the Non-Aligned Movement, an attempt by former colonies to affirm their independence from the two superpowers of the time: the United States and its allies, and the Soviet bloc. As conceived at the time, the constitutional clause precludes the use of Malta as a military base but does not preclude security guarantees. To this extent, in 1976, the Labour Party's electoral manifesto proposed that Malta enter into a four-nation guarantee for its security with Italy, France, Libya, and Algeria.

In 2004, Malta joined the European Union with two provisos: a protocol affirming that abortion remains a national prerogative and a declaration affirming Malta's constitutional neutrality. Over the next two decades, Maltese foreign policy was broadly aligned with that of the European Union, and like all member states, Malta is a signatory to the mutual defence clause in the Treaty of Lisbon, which states that "if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter." However, this is qualified by the proviso that it should "not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States." It remains unclear how this clause can be effectively enforced without NATO involvement. Malta remains one of three neutral countries in the European Union, alongside Austria and Ireland.

History did not stop in 2004. In fact, even then, history was unfolding when the US, with the support of the UK (then an EU member), invaded Iraq, splitting the EU into two camps: Italy, Spain, and Poland participated in the invasion, while France and Germany opposed it. While the former affirmed Atlanticist ties, the latter began asserting European autonomy. However, US defence commitments to its Western European allies were never questioned, especially following the election of Barack Obama to the White House. The first doubts began emerging during the Trump presidency, which raised questions about whether Europeans and Americans still shared a common set of values. But the election of Joe Biden and the Russian invasion of Ukraine reaffirmed the alliance. Finland and Sweden—two neutral social democracies—also opted to join NATO in response to this very real threat, a move endorsed by a wide spectrum of society in both countries.

What finally rocked the boat was the re-election of Donald Trump, JD Vance's ideological assault in a speech in Munich, and the humiliation of Zelensky in a meeting with Trump in the Oval Office. This triggered a contradictory response: on one hand, EU leaders speak of strategic autonomy, while on the other, they remain responsive to Trump's calls for EU member states to pay their NATO dues. Moreover there a also a risk that  increased military spending ends up increasing the EU's dependence on US arms exports at least in the short term.  This raises the question: Will increased military spending strengthen or weaken Europe's political autonomy? And how advisable is it to enhance military cooperation and spending in the absence of a federal structure of government that can subject defence structures to democratic scrutiny?  In short, can there be a defence union without a political union? Can one put the cart before the horse?

That said, with Russia and the USA actively seeking to weaken the EU, the writing is on the wall: Europe can only survive as an autonomous bloc if it affirms its political unity. And any political unity must be based on a common set of democratic values—values that are actively being challenged from within. This challenge raises the most pertinent question about the desirability of militarisation: what happens if this power falls into the hands of a victorious internal enemy? It is also worth noting that to defeat this internal enemy, the EU must boost its social and infrastructural spending. While Europe needs to defend itself from an aggressive neighbour, all will be in vain if Europe falls into the hands of authoritarians, some of whom are already dictating the tune of EU policy.  The risk is that this militaristic drift will end up undermining the very values we are supposed to be defending.  So while I welcome any relaxation of deficit rules,  a balancing act is needed between military and social needs.  Any debt break needs to include provisions for increased spending on climate change, infrastructure and social welfare.  For to win the ideological war democrats must have the tools to invest in welfare, health, education and general well being.   

And where does Malta fit into all this? Let's face it: Malta is no military power and is under no significant pressure to contribute to the EU's military needs. What I find troubling is the affirmation of our neutrality as a way of asserting independence not from NATO, the USA, or Russia, but from the EU itself, of which we are a member. Moreover, history will not wait for us. Europe faces a choice between democratic federalism and a relapse into aggressive nation-states, torn apart by external powers. What concerns me is not our military neutrality but the discourse in which it is sometimes framed—for example, the Prime Minister's failure to express solidarity with Ukraine following the humiliation of its leader in the Oval Office. In the end, we can remain militarily neutral, but we must also be clear about where we stand in the divide between autocracies and democracies. Yes, we should also call out the gross hypocrisy on Gaza, but the most effective way to do so is by joining other EU member states that have given full recognition to the state of Palestine.   In this sense we should be active participants in the conservation not just as a nation but also as EU citizens.  For ultimately the future of the EU depends on the emergence of a new polity of citizens whose concerns are not limited to the narrow interests of the individual nation states.